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Pension obligation is the present value of the benefits based on an employee’s service to
a particular date. The funded status of the pension benefits represents the difference between
plan assets and pension obligations, and the difference is reflected in the balance sheet
(FASB 2010a, par. 4). There are three pension obligation concepts based on salary levels
and the vesting. Accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) is calculated considering the current
salary levels (FASB 1985, par. 18). ABO is the sum of vested benefit obligation (VBO) and
unvested benefits. ABO and VBO provide information about the obligation that a firm
would incur if a defined benefit plan were discontinued (FASB 1985, par. 18). Projected
benefit obligation (PBO) is calculated under the final salary levels (FASB 1985, par. 17).
PBO is the sum of ABO and future salary increases. The Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) has considered which pension obligation concepts should be adopted as a
recognized item. In 2006, the FASB issued the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
(SFAS) No. 158: Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement
Plans ― an amendment of FASB Statements No. 87, 88, 106, and 132(R). PBO is adopted
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as a recognized item in the SFAS No. 158 (FASB 2010a, par. 4). ABO is adopted only as a
disclosure item according to SFAS No. 1581.
After considering disclosure items, in 2014, the FASB issued the Exposure Draft:
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting Chapter 8: Notes to Financial Statements
(2014ED). The FASB outlined the items a firm had to include as disclosure items. After
that, the FASB considered the disclosure items to add or remove according to the 2014ED.
It suggested removing ABO from the disclosure items in the Exposure Draft: Compensation-
Retirement Benefits-Defined Benefit Plans-General (Subtopic 715-20) Changes to the Disclosure
Requirements for Defined Benefit Plans (2016ED). The FASB considered whether ABO had
more value relevance than PBO. The FASB received many opinions on removing ABO from
disclosure items. If ABO were removed from disclosure items, a firm would have to include
only PBO in disclosure items.
There is no evidence that ABO has more value relevance than PBO post SFAS No. 158.
In Japan, some firms have adopted the U.S. GAAP. Do firms not need to disclose ABO?
Disclosure of only PBO can provide information useful to those who use financial statements
in making decisions. This study examines the value relevance of ABO compared with PBO.
The sample consists of Japanese firms that have adopted SFAS No. 158.
2. FASB’s Consideration of Disclosure Items and ABO
2.1 FASB’s consideration of disclosure items
The FASB cautioned that excessive disclosure items might cause users to overlook
important information and that they might be burdensome for reporting firms (FASB 2014,
par. D16). The FASB limited the range of disclosure items in three ways: relevance, cost
constraint, and future-oriented information (FASB 2014, pars. D17-31). The FASB then
defined three disclosure types (FASB 2014, par. D32)2. Some users can understand recognized
items without additional information (FASB 2014, par. D34), but most need additional
information. The FASB opined that the recognized items should have been explained to
enable users to understand the nature of the underlying phenomenon as well as related,
significant uncertainties (FASB 2014, par. D37). Additional information about the recognized
items includes alternative measurements and information to support those measurements
(FASB 2014, par. D38). The FASB stated that alternative measures were useful in certain
1 In the SFAS No. 87: Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, ABO is adopted as a recognized item when
ABO exceeds the fair value of plan assets (FASB 1985, pars. 36-38). However, this treatment is not
permitted in SFAS No. 158.
2 Disclosure types are additional information about the recognized items, information about the reporting
firms, and information about other past events and current conditions and circumstances that can affect
a firm’s cash flows.
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circumstances, and that users might have different needs and thus might need different
measures (FASB 2014, par. BC8). The FASB then issued the Conceptual Framework for
Financial Reporting Chapter 8: Notes to Financial Statements.
2.2 FASB’s consideration of ABO
ABO is the alternative measure of PBO. In the 2016ED, the FASB considered whether
the disclosure of ABO was useful in assessing prospects for cash flows (FASB 2016a, par.
BC11). After consideration, FASB suggested that ABO should have been removed from
disclosure items as ABO did not represent future cash flows when defined benefit plans
were not settled or curtailed, and that PBO was remeasured in case of settlement or
curtailment (FASB 2016a, par. BC12).
A total of 34 comment letters were sent to the FASB. In analyzing the letters, I found
that 21 approved of the removal of ABO from disclosure items, and that eight letters
disapproved of it. The reasons for the approval were as follows (FASB 2016b).
1. The elimination of ABO from disclosure items will not result in the elimination of
decision-useful information.
2. PBO includes assumptions of future salary increases and is different from ABO.
3. PBO is adopted as a recognized item.
PBO includes forecast information on future cash flows and is adopted as a recognized
item under the SFAS No. 158. On the other hand, the reasons of the disapproval were as
follows (FASB 2016b).
1. ABO provides users with useful information on the obligation firms will incur if
defined benefit plans are settled or curtailed.
2. ABO is the most consistent with the remeasurement of PBO resulting from a defined
benefit plan’s settlement or curtailment. ABO will provide users with relevant information
if the use of the plan is limited.
3. ABO is the actuarial present value of future benefits attributed to an employee’s
services rendered till a particular date.
4. ABO is an intermediate step in the calculation of PBO. The cost to disclose ABO is
minimal.
Specifically, the main reason for retaining ABO is the usefulness of the information it
provides. If a settlement or a curtailment occurs, a firm will incur ABO at most and not
future salary increases. The disclosure of ABO enables users to take the effect of settlement
or curtailment into consideration. Some believe that ABO provides users with information
useful in making decisions. A comment relating to reason 3 states that PBO overstates the
present value of the benefits (FASB 2016b, comment letter No. 15).
The FASB considered the removal of ABO from disclosure items again and decided to
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keep the disclosure of ABO (FASB 2018c, par. BC36)3. Consequently, firms are required to
disclose both ABO and PBO.
3. Literature Review
Studies have examined the value relevance of three pension obligations. In the United
States, VBO and ABO had value relevance prior to SFAS No. 87 (Oldfield 1977; Feldstein
and Seligman 1981; Feldstein and Morck 1982; Daley 1984; Dhaliwal 1986; Landsman
1986) and PBO has value relevance post SFAS No. 87 (Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue 1993;
Gopalakrishnan 1994; Picconi 2006; Hann et al. 2007b). Some studies also argue that VBO,
ABO, and PBO have value relevance post SFAS No. 87 in Japan (Nakano 1997; Sakurai
1998; Nakano 1999; Nakano 2000).
Some studies have examined the value relevance more deeply. Barth (1991) compared the
value relevance between ABO and PBO. The study provides evidence that there are cases
when users think ABO is more important than PBO and vice versa. Yu (2016) examined the
role of future salary increases from 2003 to 2008. The study provides evidence that firms
with larger future salary increases are likely to settle or curtail their defined benefit plans,
and that the value relevance of firms with settlement or curtailment is positively associated
with future salary increases.
If a settlement or a curtailment occurs, a firm will incur ABO at most; it will not need to
incur future salary increases. Thus, I argue users will use ABO more than PBO if they make
decisions on firms with larger future salary increases. These studies have not examined the
value relevance based on the size of future salary increases. ABO is treated only as a
disclosure item post SFAS No. 158. PBO is the only pension obligation treated as a
recognized item post SFAS No. 158. Thus, this study aims to examine whether firms need
to disclose ABO post SFAS No. 158.
4. Hypothesis Development and Research Design
4.1 Hypothesis development
The objective of financial reporting is to provide financial information that is useful to
financial statement users in making decisions (FASB 2010b, pars. OB2-OB11). Users need
information to help them assess firms’ future cash flows (FASB 2010b, par. OB3). Previous
studies have examined the decision-making of investors as reflected in stock prices. The
current study also examines investors’ decision-making. Firms usually incur PBO. Thus, I
argue that PBO can be used to help investors assess a firm’s future pension cash flows. On
the other hand, ABO is the alternative measure of PBO. It is not certain whether a firm will
3 All members of the FASB approved the disclosure of ABO (FASB 2018b).
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settle or curtail its defined benefit plan in the future. However, ABO provides information to
help users assess the obligation firms will incur if defined benefit plans are settled or
curtailed. Thus, I argue that ABO is useful in terms of investors’ decision-making. Previous
studies provide evidence that PBO and ABO have value relevance under SFAS No. 87. The
current study examines the value relevance of PBO and ABO under SFAS No. 158. I
therefore formulate the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: PBO has value relevance.
Hypothesis 2: ABO has value relevance.
The FASB regards alternative measures as useful information in certain circumstances.
Previous studies provide important evidence as follows. First, there are cases when investors
think ABO is more important than PBO and vice versa. Second, firms with larger future
salary increases are likely to settle or curtail their defined benefit plans. It is highly possible
that firms with larger future salary increases will incur not PBO but ABO. Thus, I argue that
investors will use ABO more than PBO if they make decisions on firms with larger future
salary increases. Future salary increases are included in PBO, and they are treated as a
recognized item. Thus, the explanatory power of ABO will be different from that of PBO if
a firm’s future salary increases are larger. I therefore formulate the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3: ABO has more value relevance than PBO if the firm’s future salary
increases are larger.
Hypothesis 4: The explanatory power of ABO is higher than that of PBO if the firm’s
future salary increases are larger.
4.2 Research design
Many previous studies employ market value as the dependent variable, and both balance
sheet items and income statement items as explanatory variables (Ohlson 1995; Barth et al.
1998; Harris and Muller 1999; Goncharov and Hodgson 2011; Dong et al. 2014; Mechelli
and Cimini 2014). The value relevance of pension obligations has been similarly examined
(Nakano 2000; Hann et al. 2007a; Hann et al. 2007b). Such studies provide evidence that
both balance sheet and income statement items have value relevance. They also suggest that
multicollinearity occurs between pension assets and pension obligations, and they set the
difference as an explanatory variable (Nakano 1997; Nakano 1999). Thus, this study employs
the following regression models.
MVEit = α0 + α1(ASSETS−LIABIRITY)it + α2(PA−PBO)it + α3NIit + α4R&Dit
+ α5DYearit + εit (1)
MVEit = β0 + β1(ASSETS−LIABIRITY)it + β2(PA−ABO)it + β3NIit + β4R&Dit
+ β5DYearit + εit (2)
MVEit : Market Value of firm i in year t
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ASSETSit : Total Assets excluding prepaid pension assets of firm i in year t
LIABIRITYit : Total Liabilities excluding accrued pension liabilities of firm i in year t
PAit : Pension Assets of firm i in year t
PBOit : PBO of firm i in year t
ABOit : ABO of firm i in year t
NIit : Net Income before excluding taxes of firm i in year t
R&Dit : Research and Development Expenses of firm i in year t
DYearit : Year Dummies of firm i in year t
All variables except Dyearit are deflated by the total assets at the beginning of the fiscal
year. Means and standard deviations differ depending on variables. This study examines the
hypotheses by standardizing the coefficients and t-values. Model (1) is based on PBO and
Model (2) on ABO. Hypothesis 1 and 2 are tested using the coefficients of pension
obligations. I argue that PBO and ABO have value relevance post SFAS No. 158; therefore,
I expect that α2>0 and β2>0. Research and development expenses (R&Dit) and the fiscal
year (Dyearit) are controlled according to previous studies (Hann et al. 2007a; Hann et al.
2007b; Yu 2013). Hypothesis 3 is tested by comparing α2 with β2. Both coefficients are
assumed to be different. Paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test (Spatz 1997, pp. 307-
332; Nakagomi 2006, pp. 134-142) are also employed. Adjusted R squared (Adj. R2) is
compared between Model (1) and Model (2), and Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) is
also used. The model with the smaller AIC value is the better model4. For Hypothesis 4, the
Vuong test is adopted.
5. Empirical Results
5.1 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
The sample consists of Japanese firms disclosing both PBO and ABO under SFAS No.
158. I obtained financial data except ABO from Nikkei NEEDS Financial Data. I obtained
ABO data from the database eol5. I also obtained stock prices data from Stock Price CD-
ROM (2019). Japanese firms under U.S. GAAP adopted SFAS No. 158 as of the end of the
fiscal year ending after December 15, 2006. Study period is from 2007 through 2018, for
which data are available. The fiscal year-end is limited to March. In Japan, firms issue
public Annual Securities Reports within three months after fiscal year-end. Investors can
only obtain ABO from the disclosure items in these reports. Thus, I argue stock prices in
the three months after the fiscal year-end reflect investors’ decision-making on disclosure
items. I excluded firms for which fewer than 12 fiscal months were available, banks and
4 Refer to Akaike (1976) and Akaike et al. (2007).
5 See the PRONEXUS website at https://www.pronexus.co.jp/solution/database/eol_eng.html (accessed on
May 11, 2019).
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insurance firms, and firms whose stock prices or the total assets at the beginning of the
fiscal year were not available. The bottom and top 1 percent of all variables except Dyearit
are deleted to remove the effect of outliers. The main sample includes 248 observations.
This study also examines the value relevance based on the size of future salary increases.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. (PBO−ABO)it represents the variable of future salary
increases. In the distribution of (PBO−ABO)it, the range from Q3 to the maximum is 0.011
while the range from minimum to Q3 is 0.009. The smaller (PBO−ABO)it suggests that the
effect of future salary increases is small. I think the explanatory power between Model (1)
and Model (2) will not be different if the effect of future salary increases is small.
Therefore, this study sets the samples with the larger future salary increases as a subsample.
Hypothesis 3 and 4 are tested using the subsample, which includes 62 observations.
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients of the main variables. The correlations between
MVEit and other variables are positive and significant (p < 0.01). Thus, I expect all variables
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N=248)
Mean Std. Dev. Range Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum
MVEit 0.780 0.486 2.378 0.156 0.415 0.659 0.978 2.533
ASSETSit 1.031 0.078 0.450 0.815 0.983 1.027 1.073 1.265
LIABIRITYit 0.452 0.189 0.775 0.092 0.284 0.465 0.597 0.867
PAit 0.106 0.068 0.279 0.007 0.050 0.096 0.147 0.287
PBOit 0.145 0.093 0.360 0.013 0.066 0.119 0.223 0.373
ABOit 0.140 0.092 0.354 0.012 0.063 0.117 0.214 0.366
(PBO-ABO)it 0.006 0.005 0.020 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.020
NIit 0.057 0.043 0.251 -0.104 0.030 0.057 0.085 0.147
Table 2. Pearson and Spearman Correlation Coefficients (N=248)
MVEit (ASSETS-LIABIRITY)it (PA-PBO)it (PA-ABO)it NIit
MVEit 0.706** 0.219** 0.245** 0.725**
(ASSETS-LIABIRITY)it 0.647** 0.181** 0.193** 0.521**
(PA-PBO)it 0.210** 0.196** 0.975** 0.190**
(PA-ABO)it 0.225** 0.209** 0.993** 0.212**
NIit 0.646** 0.515** 0.296** 0.311**
The upper and lower diagonals show the Spearman and Pearson correlations, respectively.
**: p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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to be significantly positive. (PA−ABO)it has more correlation with MVEit than (PA−PBO)it. I
also expect (PA−ABO)it to have more value relevance than (PA−PBO)it.
5.2 Main results
Table 3 presents the main results. According to the main sample, all variables are positive
and significant. The coefficient of (PA-PBO)it is 0.134 and significant (p < 0.05), suggesting
that an increase in PBOit leads to the decline in MVEit. PBO has value relevance post SFAS
















(0.537) (0.511) (-0.427) (-0.413)
(ASSETS-LIABIRITY)it + 0.374 0.372 0.214 0.210
(7.342)*** (7.293)*** (1.802)* (1.802)*
(PA-PBO)it + 0.134 0.438
(2.507)** (3.186)***
(PA-ABO)it + 0.139 0.465
(2.595)** (3.472)***
NIit + 0.465 0.463 0.316 0.306
(9.211)*** (9.161)*** (2.637)** (2.587)**
R&Dit +/- 0.227 0.230 0.342 0.353
(4.262)*** (4.316)*** (2.924)*** (3.080)***
DYearit included included included included
Adj.R2 0.576 0.577 0.487 0.502
AIC 140.939 140.488 47.655 45.900
Vuong test
-0.529 -2.482**





Wilcoxon signed rank test
z-value=-13.120*** z-value=-6.846***
***: p < 0.01. **: p < 0.05. *: p < 0.1. (two-tailed)
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No. 158; therefore, Hypothesis 1 is accepted. The coefficient of (PA-ABO)it is 0.139 and
significant (p < 0.05), suggesting that an increase in ABOit leads to the decline in MVEit.
ABO has value relevance post SFAS No. 158; therefore, Hypothesis 2 is accepted. Furthermore,
Hypothesis 1 and 2 are more clearly supported in the subsample. The coefficients of (PA-
PBO)it and (PA-ABO)it are significant (p < 0.01).
The coefficient of (PA-ABO)it is higher than that of (PA-PBO)it. In the subsample, the
coefficient of (PA-ABO)it is 0.465 (t-value=3.472) while that of (PA-PBO)it is 0.438 (t-value
=3.186). In the paired t-test, the t-value of -35.261 is significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that
the value relevance of (PA-ABO)it is different from that of (PA-PBO)it. In the Wilcoxon
signed rank test, the z-value of -6.846 is significant (p < 0.01). These results indicate that
ABOit has more value relevance than PBOit in the subsample. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is
accepted. The result from the main sample also indicates that ABOit has more value
relevance than PBOit. In the main sample, the coefficient of (PA-ABO)it is higher than that
of (PA-PBO)it, and the paired t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test suggest that the value
relevance of (PA-ABO)it is different from that of (PA-PBO)it.
The explanatory power of ABO is not different from that of PBO in the main sample.
Adj. R2 for Models (1) and (2) is 0.576 and 0.577, respectively; therefore, Adj. R2 in Model
(2) is slightly higher than that in Model (1). The AIC in Model (2) is smaller and better
than that in Model (1), suggesting that Model (2) based on ABO fits the dependent variable
MVEit better than Model (1) based on PBO. However, the Vuong test gives a value of
-0.529, which is insignificant. Table 1 indicates that the main sample includes many samples
with smaller future salary increases ((PBO-ABO)it). It is unlikely that firms with smaller
future salary increases settle or curtail their defined benefit plans, and they will incur not
ABO but PBO. The explanatory power in the main sample results from many samples with
smaller future salary increases. On the other hand, the explanatory power of ABO is higher
than that of PBO in the subsample. Adj. R2 for Models (1) and (2) is 0.487 and 0.502,
respectively. AIC in Model (2) is smaller and better than that in Model (1). The Vuong test
gives a value of -2.482, which is significant (p < 0.05). Previous studies provide evidence
that firms with larger future salary increases are likely to settle or curtail their defined
benefit plans. If a settlement or a curtailment occurs, a firm will incur ABO at most. This
result provides evidence that investors use ABO more than PBO when deciding on firms
with larger future salary increases. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is accepted.
5.3 Additional analysis
The regression results of Table 3 include the sample for the transition year of SFAS No.
158. Previous studies excluded this because value relevance was sensitive to the transition
year of accounting standards (Yu 2013). Therefore, this study excluded the transition year of
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SFAS No. 158 and examined four hypotheses. Table 4 shows the results of additional
analysis.
In the main sample, all variables except the intercepts are positive and significant. The
coefficient of (PA-PBO)it is 0.132, which is significant (p < 0.05). The coefficient of (PA-
ABO)it is 0.138, which is significant (p < 0.05). The results suggest that PBO and ABO
have value relevance post SFAS No. 158; therefore, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are accepted.
Furthermore, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are more clearly supported in the subsample.
















(-0.957) (-0.953) (-0.925) (-0.890)
(ASSETS-LIABIRITY)it + 0.412 0.410 0.297 0.288
(7.564)*** (7.524)*** (2.331)** (2.301)**
(PA-PBO)it + 0.132 0.411
(2.261)** (2.848)***
(PA-ABO)it + 0.138 0.448
(2.349)** (3.177)***
NIit + 0.398 0.396 0.241 0.234
(7.263)*** (7.227)*** (1.861)* (1.841)*
R&Dit +/- 0.224 0.227 0.327 0.347
(3.867)*** (3.921)*** (2.603)** (2.806)***
DYearit included included included included
Adj.R2 0.564 0.564 0.492 0.509
AIC 105.776 105.370 40.568 38.692
Vuong test
-0.478 -3.306***





Wilcoxon signed rank test
z-value=-12.384*** z-value=-6.451***
***: p < 0.01. **: p < 0.05. *: p < 0.1. (two-tailed)
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The coefficient of (PA-ABO)it is higher than that of (PA-PBO)it. In the subsample, the
coefficient of (PA-ABO)it is 0.448 (t-value=3.177) while that of (PA-PBO)it is 0.411 (t-value
=2.848). In the paired t-test, the t-value is -33.241, which is significant (p < 0.01). In the
Wilcoxon signed rank test, the z-value is -6.451, which is significant (p < 0.01). These
results indicate that ABOit has more value relevance than PBOit in the subsample; therefore,
Hypothesis 3 is accepted. The results from the main sample also indicate that ABOit has
more value relevance than PBOit.
The explanatory power of ABO is not different from that of PBO in the main sample. On
the other hand, the explanatory power of ABO is higher than that of PBO in the subsample.
Adj. R2 for Models (1) and (2) is 0.492 and 0.509, respectively. AIC in Model (2) is smaller
and better than that in Model (1). The Vuong test is -3.306 and significant (p < 0.01). This
result provides evidence that investors use ABO more than PBO if they make decisions on
firms with larger future salary increases. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is accepted.
Additional analysis confirms that all four hypotheses are accepted.
6. Summary and Conclusion
This study examines the value relevance of ABO compared with PBO. The study used a
sample of Japanese firms that had adopted SFAS No. 158. ABO is treated only as a
disclosure item under SFAS No. 158. In the 2014ED, the FASB considered which disclosure
items firms had to include. The FASB then suggested removing ABO from disclosure items.
Considering comment letters, FASB finally decided to keep the disclosure of ABO. The
main point of discussion was whether ABO was more useful than PBO in assessing
prospects for cash flows. Considering previous studies, I think the value relevance of ABO
is different from that of PBO in the size of future salary increases. This study provides the
following evidence. First, PBO and ABO have value relevance post SFAS No. 158. Second,
ABO has more value relevance than PBO. Third, the explanatory power of ABO is higher
than that of PBO when investors make decisions on firms with larger future salary increases.
ABO is the alternative measure of PBO. The FASB stated that alternative measures were
useful in certain circumstances. This study provides evidence that ABO is more useful than
PBO in investors’ decision-making in certain cases. PBO is the only pension obligation
concept treated as a recognized item under SFAS No. 158. However, a firm will incur ABO
at most if a settlement or a curtailment occurs. The disclosure of ABO enables users to take
the effect of settlement or curtailment into consideration. Thus, this study supports the
disclosure of ABO.
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